The Turkish Competition Board’s Med Yapım and Ay Yapım Decision: Investigation into the Labour Market in the TV Series Sector Concluded Through Settlement

1. Background of Investigation

The complaint submitted to the Authority alleged that Med Yapım, owing to its financial strength and the partnerships it has established with various production companies, had acquired a significant market share, and that, in the agreements concluded with channels and platforms, the international sales rights were assumed by MA Distribution Televizyon ve Filmcilik Anonim Şirketi (“MADD“), jointly established by Med Yapım and Ay Yapım. The complaint further alleged that MADD pursued an aggressive sales policy abroad; that it concluded exclusive agreements with major customers such as HBO Latin America, under which all series to be produced would be allocated to the contracting customer; that, because series were sold in packages, customers were compelled to also purchase low-performing series they had not requested; and that these practices prevented other production companies from selling to those customers.

In August 2024, the Board decided to conduct a preliminary investigation concerning Med Yapım, Ay Yapım, and MADD. During the on-site inspections carried out at the undertakings in the course of the preliminary investigation, findings were obtained, independently of the distribution allegations forming the subject of the complaint, indicating that Ay Yapım and Med Yapım had exchanged information concerning employee wages and raise rates in labour markets. Thereupon, the Board decided to initiate an investigation against the three undertakings pursuant to Article 41 of Law No. 4054. Since no evidence was obtained indicating that competition in labour markets had been infringed with respect to MADD, it was established that this undertaking had no conduct subject to settlement.

In January 2025, the parties requested the initiation of the settlement procedure under the Regulation on the Settlement Procedure Applicable in Investigations on Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions Restricting Competition and Abuses of Dominant Position (“Settlement Regulation“). The TCB rejected these requests in February 2025. The investigation period was extended by six months, and a second round of on-site inspections was carried out at the undertakings in March 2025. Ay Yapım and Med Yapım applied in October 2025 for the reconsideration of their rejected settlement requests; notably, the Board this time accepted the settlement applications.

The decision does not set out the reasoning behind the rejection of the initial settlement requests. The fact that a request rejected at an early stage of the investigation could be accepted upon being renewed before the notification of the investigation report demonstrates that the Board exercises its discretion under Article 5 of the Settlement Regulation according to the course of the investigation.

2. Relevant Market Assessment

In conducting its relevant market assessment, the Board recalled the approach adopted in its past decisions concerning labour markets. In its 2005 TV Series Producers decision, the Board examined allegations of preventing actor transfers and fixing actor fees in the television series production market and defined the relevant product market as “TV series production.”[3] In the Private Schools decision, the sharing of information on personnel wages was addressed within the framework of the private school operation services market[4]; in the İzmir Container decision, while it was stated that a market definition oriented toward employees could be made given that the examination concerned the labour market, a definitive definition was not deemed necessary[5]. A similar approach was adopted in the KASTDER[6] and Private Hospitals[7] decisions; in the Private Hospitals decision, while it was stated that the relevant product market could be defined as “labour supply/labour market in healthcare services,” no definitive market definition was made.

Proceeding from this line of case law, the TCB stated that, when defining markets in labour markets, the analysis should be based on the value that labour contributes to the relevant activity and on the aspects that distinguish the labour under examination from other labour factors. Since each of the actors involved in the series production process has a different job description, and these job descriptions are, by their nature, not substitutable for one another, the Board considered it possible to define the relevant product market separately for each individual position. That said, given that the documents and findings obtained within the scope of the file did not relate to a specific personnel group, the Board considered that the relevant product market could be defined, in the broadest sense, as “the labour market for employees in the TV series production sector.”

As regards the relevant geographic market, the Board stated that, in labour markets, the geographic market should be determined on the basis of the limits of employee mobility, and, referring to the OECD’s approach, noted that the geographic market could be defined as the area within which employees can find similar job opportunities by incurring reasonable costs. The Board stated that, for employees, the cost element encompasses not only material costs but also intangible factors such as willingness to relocate or commute, age, family, and health, and that this allows the geographic market to be defined either more narrowly or more broadly. For the purposes of the file, it was considered that the relevant geographic market could be determined as “Türkiye.”

Ultimately, proceeding from paragraph 20 of the Guidelines on the Definition of Relevant Market, the Board concluded that no definitive market definition was required within the scope of the file, on the ground that the competitive concerns could produce restrictive effects on competition under all alternative market definitions.

3. The Legal Framework Governing Information Exchange in Labour Markets and the Development of the Board’s Case Law

In the decision, the Board first set out the general theoretical framework governing information exchange. The TCB accepts that not every exchange of information between competitors gives rise to competitive concerns; information exchange may also generate efficiencies by remedying information asymmetry, enabling undertakings to benchmark themselves against their competitors, and reducing costs. The starting point of the assessment is the concept of “strategic uncertainty.” In competitive markets, rival players should not have knowledge of one another’s current or future strategic conduct; the partial or complete elimination of this uncertainty through information exchange brings the matter within the boundaries of competition law.

Referring to the Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, the Board emphasized that the restrictive effect of information exchange on competition depends on the nature of the information shared. It is accepted that restrictive effects on competition will remain limited where the information moves away from being a trade secret and becomes public, is aggregated rather than individualized, and is based on historical data rather than being forward-looking. By contrast, the exchange of forward-looking strategic information, such as prices and quantities, artificially increases transparency in the market and facilitates coordination. The decision underlines that even where strategic information is shared on a one-off basis and/or produces no effect in the market, the conduct may be characterized as an infringement under Article 4 of Law No. 4054.

In transposing this general framework to labour markets, the TCB also drew on comparative law. The decision notes that, in the US, the DOJ and the FTC have stated that the exchange of information concerning employees may give rise to anticompetitive coordination, and that the CMA lists wage-fixing, no-poach agreements, and information exchange as the three main types of restrictive conduct in the labour market; reference is made, to the same effect, to the guidance issued by the Canadian, Lithuanian, and Portuguese authorities.

In Turkish competition law, labour markets have become one of the areas to which the Board has devoted the most intensive effort in recent years. The number of the Board’s decisions concerning labour markets has risen rapidly; since the first comprehensive decision in 2023, successive decisions have been issued in the technology, education, healthcare, and pharmaceutical sectors. The milestones of this case law include the 2023 multi-sector gentlemen’s agreements decision, in which 37 undertakings were examined and administrative fines totalling approximately TRY 151.1 million were imposed on 16 undertakings[8]; the 2024 decision imposing fines totalling TRY 91.7 million on 8 undertakings in the technology and telecommunications sector[9]; the French High Schools decision, in which wage-fixing was penalized as a standalone infringement[10]; and the 2025 Pharmaceutical Sector decision, in which the fines imposed on settling and non-settling undertakings totalled more than TRY 726 million[11].

In addition to this case law, the Guidelines on Competition Infringements in Labour Markets, published on November 21, 2024, state that information exchange may have an anticompetitive object or effect not only where it relates to the output market but also where it relates to the input market; that information on all manner of working conditions, such as employees’ wages, working hours, fringe benefits, severance payments, and leave entitlements, will be regarded as competitively sensitive; and that any information exchange carried out with the object of restricting competition in the labour market will be deemed to restrict competition irrespective of its effect.

4. The Evidence Obtained Within the Scope of the File and the Board’s Assessment

The infringement finding rests on a WhatsApp correspondence, referred to in the decision as “Finding-1,” obtained during the on-site inspection carried out at Ay Yapım. The correspondence took place between Ay Yapım’s Deputy General Manager for Strategy and Business Development and Med Yapım’s CEO on July 19, 2024, July 29, 2024, and August 6, 2024. In the exchange dated July 19, 2024, the Ay Yapım executive asked the Med Yapım executive about the raise rate to be applied in July; the Med Yapım executive stated, in a voice message, that work was underway on whether a raise at the inflation rate would be applied and that information on the matter would be provided. In the exchange dated July 29, 2024, the Med Yapım executive shared with the other party the raise rate envisaged for permanent personnel; in the exchange dated August 6, 2024, statements were identified revealing the Ay Yapım executive’s effort to keep the wage to be paid to an employee at the same level as Med Yapım. On this basis, the Board determined the start date of the infringement as July 19, 2024, and its end date as August 6, 2024, establishing the duration of the infringement as 19 days.

The Board assessed that the correspondence in question demonstrated that current and strategic information directly concerning competition parameters, such as the raise rate to be applied to employee wages, had been shared between competing undertakings. The TCB stated that the concrete findings were assessed not merely as an individual correspondence but as conduct amounting to an infringement of the parties’ independent decision-making processes concerning labour costs, and concluded that the information exchange infringed Article 4 of Law No. 4054.

The striking aspect of the decision is that the infringement finding rests on evidence that is extremely narrow in both scope and duration. A single bilateral chain of communication between two undertakings, consisting of three days of messaging and spanning a period of 19 days, was deemed sufficient for an infringement finding and an administrative fine. This approach is consistent with the principle set out in the theoretical framework of the decision; an infringement finding is possible even where strategic information is shared on a one-off basis and produces no effect in the market. The fact that the raise rate information had not yet been implemented as of the date of sharing and constituted a forward-looking decision stands out as the element reinforcing the strategic value of the information.

The full investigation was concluded through settlement. In the settlement negotiations held in November 2025, the parties argued that the allegation rested on a single piece of evidence, that the correspondence concerned the wage of an employee jointly hired at the request of a television channel abroad, and that the sharing remained limited to a single instance. The parties further argued that no established case law on information exchange existed as of the date of the finding, and requested the application of mitigating factors and the calculation of the fine on the basis of labour turnover. Within the framework of the principle that the more favourable provision applies, the TCB carried out separate assessments under the Former Regulation on Fines, which was in force on the date the full investigation was opened, and the New Regulation on Fines, which entered into force while the investigation was pending; it applied no duration-based increase given that the infringement lasted 19 days, identified no aggravating or mitigating factors, and concluded that there was no difference between the fine rates calculated under the two regulations. Within this framework, by the interim settlement decision dated November 6, 2025, and numbered 25-41/993-MUA, a 25% reduction was applied, as a result of the settlement procedure, to the fines determined on the basis of 2024 annual gross revenues; the final fine amounts were set at TRY 47,811,989.24 for Med Yapım and TRY 75,790,035.98 for Ay Yapım. The parties’ requests concerning the fine base and mitigating factors were not granted.

Conclusion

By its decision dated November 20, 2025, the TCB found that the sharing of current and competitively sensitive information concerning employee wages and raise rates between two competing undertakings active in the TV series production sector infringed Article 4 of Law No. 4054, and concluded the full investigation through the settlement procedure. The decision clearly sets out the Board’s standard of proof regarding information exchange in labour markets, in that even a single bilateral chain of communication lasting 19 days and consisting of three days of messaging was deemed sufficient for an infringement finding. This approach constitutes the first application in the TV series sector of the line of case law in which mere information exchange (without being tied to any wage-fixing or no-poach agreement) is penalized as a standalone infringement.

The following point regarding the scope of the decision should be underlined: the full investigation concluded through settlement concerns solely the allegation of information exchange regarding employee wages; the allegations forming the principal subject of the complaint, which relate to the international distribution activities conducted through MADD and the exclusive sales agreements, fall outside the scope of this decision. Indeed, the parties stated in the settlement negotiations that comprehensive commitments had been submitted with respect to MADD. In this respect, the decision concludes only the labour market leg of the investigation.

The decision sits at the intersection of two of the Authority’s current priority areas. The 2005 TV Series Producers decision, one of the Board’s first decisions concerning labour markets, likewise related to the TV series sector, involving allegations of preventing actor transfers and fixing actor fees; the present decision also refers to that decision in the context of market definition. The Board’s return to the same sector twenty years later, this time equipped with the modern information exchange doctrine, the framework of the Guidelines on Competition Infringements in Labour Markets, and the settlement procedure, demonstrates the enduring place of both the media and content sector and labour markets on the Authority’s agenda. The chain of case law extending from the multi-sector gentlemen’s agreements decision to the technology, education, and pharmaceutical sectors has, with this decision, now reached the creative industries as well.

The debate over the base of the administrative fine also constitutes one of the noteworthy aspects of the decision. In the settlement negotiations, the parties requested that the fine be calculated on the basis of labour turnover rather than total turnover, grounding this request in the Board’s approach in its recent decisions. Indeed, in the Pharmaceutical Sector decision, the Board calculated the administrative fine by taking into account the ratio of employee costs to turnover[12]. By contrast, Board Member Hasan Hüseyin Ünlü, in his concurring opinion in that decision, argued that, pursuant to Council of State case law, the fine should be calculated on the basis of net sales. Ünlü expressed the same view in his dissenting opinion in the 2023 gentlemen’s agreements decision[13]. In the present decision, the Board calculated the fine on the basis of total annual gross revenues for 2024. Consequently, in the face of approaches that vary from file to file, the question of how the fine base is to be determined in labour market infringements is expected to remain a subject of debate before both the Board and the administrative courts.

[1] Attorney Gülce Korkmaz is the external competition law consultant of Baş | Kaymaz Law Firm. After completing her master’s degree at Bilkent University, she is currently pursuing her doctoral studies in the field of competition law at the Faculty of Law of Lüneburg Leuphana University (Germany) as a PhD researcher with the scholarship of the Joachim Herz Foundation.
[2] For the reasoned TCB decision dated November 20, 2025, and numbered 25-43/1044-596, please see here (only available in Turkish).
[3] TCB’s TV Series Producers decision dated July 28, 2005, and numbered 05-49/710-195.
[4] TCB’s Private Schools decision dated March 3, 2011, and numbered 11-12/226-76.
[5] TCB’s İzmir Container decision dated January 2, 2020, and numbered 20-01/3-2.
[6] TCB’s KASTDER decisions dated March 24, 2020, and numbered 20-43/588-262, and dated March 4, 2021, and numbered 21-11/148-61.
[7] TCB’s Private Hospitals decision dated February 24, 2022, and numbered 22-10/152-62.
[8] TCB decision dated July 26, 2023, and numbered 23-34/649-218.
[9] TCB decision dated February 27, 2024, and numbered 24-10/170-66.
[10] TCB decision dated April 24, 2024, and numbered 24-20/466-196. For our information note containing our detailed analyses of the decision, please see https://www.baskaymaz.av.tr/french-high-schools-cartels-joint-determination-of-enrolment-fees-scholarship-rates-and-teachers-wages/
[11] TCB’s Pharmaceutical Sector decision dated September 11, 2025, and numbered 25-34/810-474.
[12] TCB’s Pharmaceutical Sector decision dated September 11, 2025, and numbered 25-34/810-474.
[13] TCB decision dated July 26, 2023, and numbered 23-34/649-218. In the dissenting opinion he authored jointly with Berat Uzun, Ünlü stated that the administrative fine base should be calculated on the basis of net sales, within the framework of the third paragraph of Article 16 of Law No. 4054 and the definition of annual gross revenue in the Regulation on Fines. For our information note containing our detailed assessments of the said decision, please see https://www.baskaymaz.av.tr/turkish-competition-board-fines-gentlemens-agreements-in-labour-markets/

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